Archived posting to the Leica Users Group, 2007/07/05
[Author Prev] [Author Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Author Index] [Topic Index] [Home] [Search]At 12:34 PM 7/5/2007, Lawrence Zeitlin wrote: >The actual number was >361,691. >As far as Adam Wagner's Leica Model H, Emil shows the patent number >as 1,233,250. I assume it was the German patent. I was unable to find >the equivalent US patent however I did locate the Canadian patent. It >was assigned to Ernst Leitz GMBH. Clearly this implies that it was a >"work for hire" produced as a condition of Wagner's employment rather >than an independent project. Larry This camera was part of the first block of IIIc bodies and dates from 1940. It was one of 5,070 IIIc's made in that year. We are really not to far apart on Adam Wagner and the Leica H, but there is a bit more to the tale. Leica experienced a total lack of demand when they produced the Leica 72 in the early 1950's, and only around 180 were produced at Wetzlar and Midland. They then produced the Leica Box as a concept camera but there was absolutely no interest by Ernst Leitz III to manufacture this. Adam Wagner's background and expertise was in LTM cameras. The cessation of LTM production in 1959 meant that there was no longer a position for him at Leitz. He then asked to be kept on to develop the Leica H. Ernst Leitz III agreed in order to protect Wagner's retirement but told Wagner before he started that the Leica H, like the Box, was to be a concept camera only and would not be placed in quantity production. Leitz just had no interest in repeating the disaster of the 72. Wagner got full retirement when he left and there were no hard feelings towards him by Leitz management, though Wagner seems to have held quite the grudge against the mavens of Wetzlar. The decision not to pursue an SLR in the middle 1950's was a simple and relatively wise decision. The guys at Wetzlar only had to glance over to Stuttgart to note how Zeiss Ikon was no longer making a profit (the last was in 1954, I believe) due to the development and production costs for the Contarex which, by the time of its introduction in 1959/1960 (it was introduced twice), was making the Zeiss Ikon balance sheets resemble hospital bedsheets from Stalingrad. Kodak AG endured similar fiscal horrors when it began to shift from the Retina RF to the Retina SLR lines. Zeiss Ikon was ultimately backed by the Carl Zeiss lensworks, a phenomenally profitable concern by 1958, while Kodak AG was backed by Rochester. Leitz had no such underpinnings: their only financial reserves were the personal wealth of the Leitz family, and that was not that large. Leitz could not risk significant financial losses and available funding had to be dedicated to their leading M3 and M2 line which, at the least, they were able to produce with some profit or at least parity: Leitz' fiscal woes only came with the introduction of the Leicaflex and successors. The most successful Postwar camera line produced by Zeiss Ikon was the Contaflex SLR line, a camera system narrowly aimed at advanced amateurs and quite popular. Zeiss Ikon made a mistake from the hubris of insisting on making the ultimate SLR system with the Contarex: had they simply absorbed Voigtl?nder, rationalized the lines, and stuck with the money-making Contaflex while shifting RF production from the Contax IIa and IIIa to the IV, we would probably still have true Zeiss Ikon products in our camera stores. Leitz missed the boat by not producing a rival line on the order of the Contaflex, a quality camera with a few add-ons and auxiliary lenses. This could have been a cash-cow providing the necessary fiscal underpinnings to allow the proper development of a capable top-end SLR. The running joke among Zeiss historians is that Zeiss Ikon lost money on every Contarex they made and sold so few that they couldn't even make up for it in volume. The Contarex was such a hyped vehicle that it caused Pentacon-to-be to cease production of the very promising Praktina, the first professional-level SLR. The extreme cost of the Contarex was known throughout the German camera industry by 1955 and influenced Leitz to avoid developing a quality SLR and also caused Franke & Heidecke to defer introduction of a medium-format SLR for a decade. It caused Kodak AG to shift from production of high-end technical and scientific cameras and aim only at the amateur market. Und so weiter. Hindsight is always 20-20 but, in the end, the Contarex provided a horrible example. (It would have been better had they all looked to Voigtl?nder as a better example, as the Braunschweig Boys managed to shift from the Prominent RF to the Bessamatic and Ultramatic SLR's with minimal financial problems and decent sales.) The Contarex was a superb camera and its lens line was to become the best ever offered for a system camera. But it failed to maintain the presence of the Contax RF in professional service, it failed to penetrate deeply into scientific and technical markets, and it sold miserably to the amateurs who had so loved the Contax RF and the Contaflex. It was not defeated per se by the Nikon F: it was defeated by Zeiss Ikon's insistence that it be better in all regards than the Nikon F and the Praktina, which caused it to be priced beyond all reason in a very competitive market. Leitz would probably have done best to have produced a relatively inexpensive SLR aimed at the amateur market while developing a quality SLR system. As it was, they had little to offer and then threw everything they had to developing the Leicaflex which came late to a market already dominated by the Nikon F. (And Leitz, Zeiss Ikon, and Franke & Heidecke failed to properly support professionals, where Nikon bent over backwards to provide loaner bodies and loaner lenses even in isolated locations and on an emergency basis. This led to the early abandonment of the Contax RF and Leica M and Rolleiflex TLR by professionals, especially when Hasselblad followed Nikon's lead in support for professionals.) There is a book to be written here. Gads. Maybe I'll put one together, though I have more writing projects on my desk than I can handle at present. Marc msmall@aya.yale.edu Cha robh b?s fir gun ghr?s fir!